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Abstract 
At the development and to the comprehension of the regulation it is necessary to 
ascertain that in our view, the subject of the regulation is the operation of the company. 
The regulation regulates the problems arising specifically during the course of the 
operation of the company, as an „ex ante” tool and by the avoidance of that upon the 
cessation of the public company, any unjustified or inconcievable costs (social costs) 
should rise. As an example, there are the infamous earlier corporate scandals (Enron, 
Parmalat, Vivendi Universal), the infringements of which drew critical social (budget) 
costs, as they left behind unsettled creditors’ claims, plenty of workplaces got terminated, 
etc. To prevent this, one of the techniques is corporate governance, as it focuses on such 
mechanisms during the course of the operation of the company as direction and control.  
With this, the cessation of the company can presumably be avoided, as it is publicly 
acknowledged that the majority of corporate scandals descend from the faults of 
leadership, direction and control. Based on the above, we may ascertain that in our 
perception, under ’corporate governance’ it’s the legal facts or interests relevant in the 
course of the operation of the company what become regulated in terms of corporate law. 
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The phenomenon, the subject of corporate governance is one such topic on 
corporate law, that has received a distinguished attention for the past decade from 
professional literature and the side of policy makers. The legal definition of 
corporate governance was set by the Cadbury Report in 1991 as: Corporate 
governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. Abstract 
as needed, this definition is appropriate to be applicable to define corporate 
governence in all parts of the world, yet further approaches are required to the 
unfolding of the content of the topic. 
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1. What is regulated by corporate governance? 
 
At the development and to the comprehension of the regulation it is 
necessary to ascertain that in our view, the subject of the regulation is the operation 
of the company. The regulation regulates the problems arising specifically during 
the course of the operation of the company, as an „ex ante” tool and by the 
avoidance of that upon the cessation of the public company, any unjustified or 
inconcievable costs (social costs) should rise. As an example, there are the 
infamous earlier corporate scandals (Enron, Parmalat, Vivendi Universal), the 
infringements of which drew critical social (budget) costs, as they left behind 
unsettled creditors’ claims, plenty of workplaces got terminated, etc. To prevent 
this, one of the techniques is corporate governance, as it focuses on such 
mechanisms during the course of the operation of the company as direction and 
control. With this, the cessation of the company can presumably be avoided, as it is 
publicly acknowledged that the majority of corporate scandals descend from the 
faults of leadership, direction and control. Based on the above, we may ascertain 
that in our perception, under ’corporate governance’ it’s the legal facts or interests 
relevant in the course of the operation of the company what become regulated in 
terms of corporate law.  
 
1.1.  The subject of corporate governance regulations 
 
The first key-term generated from the above approach is which situations, 
state of affairs, interests are regulated by law? Having reviewed the corporate 
governance rules (codes on best practices), we may constate that such situations are 
regulated by law as state of affairs, which cannot traditionally be considered as a 
field of corporate law. For instance how to (technically) summon the general 
assembly, what instruments should be applied for the efficient conduction of the 
general assembly.4 What sort of legal powers the company should assign to the 
nomination committee, how it should regulate the standing orders and daily work-
schedule of the managing directorship, what HR selection criteria should be 
applied.5 None of these fields have formed the set of regulations to corporate law 
before. This statement certainly needs fine adjustments made, as the set of rules on 
corporate law can alter by eras and economic settlements. The continuous 
expansion of the rules of responsibility in Hungary can serve as an example to the 
continuous development.6 At the examination of the classical fields of regulation of 
corporate law, we may claim that the rules of corporate law have covered the 
categories of economic companies (numerus clausus), the foundation mechanism 
(company procedure), and rules of the same branch applied to the termination as 
well: especially to the procedures of liquidation and bankruptcy as linked with 
                                                                 
4 E.g. the Corporate Governance Recommendations [hereinafter: FVA] of the Hungarian National 
Assets Management plc as per recommendations no.15-33, especially 17 and 18 
5 MNV Zrt.’s FVA recommendations on supervisory -board no.59-77, on HR criteria 13 
6 To this as a summary see: Papp (ed.): „Társasági jog”, Lectum, (Szeged, 2011) pp. 249-251. 
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insolvency. These are the terrains, where legal regulations give no choice of an 
option, allow for not any private autonomy, but provide and entirely exhaustive, 
flawless legal governance instead.  Certainly, the assurances of a ’rule-of-law’ state 
to the company’s operation are implemented by the acts of law, providing a 
standard rule for the operation in several cases, such as: the scope of authority as of 
the principal organ, conference general assembly, voting by post. 
The exhaustive regulation upon the operation of the company (the period 
from the registry of the business association until the decision on it’s termination 
was made) was one of the terrains, where the private autonomy of the members 
used to be of the broadest spectrum. Yet, assumably to the numbers of corporate 
infringements the legal regulation had to react, and was required to provide 
sufficient solution to the occurrences during the course of operation.  Since 
corporate infringements could be traced back to organizational operation, the 
recommendations of corporate governance apply by nature to the operational 
period of the company. 
 
1.2.  The legal feature of corporate governance rules 
 
Another examined conceptual element of corporate governance is: the legal 
assessment on the quality of the regulation. Corporate governance has known two 
types of rules in accordance with international trends: recommendations (for 
example for the companies listed on stock exchange in Lithuania, Poland, Romania 
and Hungary)7 and suggestions. Corporate governance comprises genuinely self-
reguatory, non-binding prescriptions, however, in Central and Eastern Europe there 
exists one peculiar line of it, demonstrated by that the to-be regulated topic in terms 
of corporate governance rules appears defined by acts of law (tipically in act) 
instead of codes and self-regulatory documents. In the process of the codification 
of corporate governance rules it can also be observed, that part of the 
recommendations is not realized in the terrains of the recommendations, but on the 
level of law (e.g.: Romania, Slovenia and Hungary), when regulating a given 
corporate governance topic-area the policy-maker genuinely privileges the change 
in the rule of law (e.g.: in Slovenia and Romania in terms of organizational rules).8 
Certainly, this can be found in the Hungarian coprorate governance practice, for 
example in the case of the publicly owned business associations it is the matter of 
remuneration as per Act CXXII of 2009. 
The system of comply or explain commenced from Great-Britain, where 
the requirement was specified that public disclosure qualifies a sanction, which 
                                                                 
7 International workshop: „Corporate governance in state-owned companies”, 11. 04. 2016., Gdansk, 
University Gdansk Faculty of Law and Administration, Societas CEE Company Law Research  
Network 
8 DJOKIC, Danila: „The Corporate Governance Statement and Audit Committee in the European 
Union and Republic of Slovenia.” Croatian Yearbook of European Law & Policy, (2009/5 pp.283-
289), M ANOLESCU, Maria – ROMAN, Aureliana Geta – ROMAN Constantin: „Corporate Governance 
of Romanian Public Interest Entities.” DAAAM International, (2010/1.) pp. 1127-1128, 1127 
Juridical Tribune     Volume 6, Issue 2, December 2016 
 
25 
encourages the company to align with the practice defined by itself.9 The proper 
standards in accordance with the recommendation are applied, yet it is at once 
questionable to set forth an optimum in the matter of the headcount for the board of 
directors or the supervisory board to operate. The term „comply or explain” means 
that in case a company shall not apply a given recommendation, then an explicit 
explanation must be supplied upon the reason why, more precisely it must publicly 
disclose the practices that are followed.  In the EU member states it was the 
directives to introduce the technique of „comply or explain”, thus this is setting the 
directive to stock-exchange companies in Hungary.10 The regulation of comply or 
explain does not equal the traditional denotation of an act of law, as it lacks the 
potential of state enforcement capability, and legal enforcement does only rely on 
the applicable prescriptions of mandatory public disclosure of the coporate 
governance report. This indeed is no regulative mistake, but the conceptual element 
to corporate governance, in which the regulation on the stock-exchange alongside 
the respective publicity is a sufficient sanction. The question of course is, whether 
or not an enforcement-potential is required, or is publicity itself a sufficient 
sanction? As we see it, it depends on stock-exchange culture, stock-exchange 
investors’ discipline. The impacts of stock-exchange culture and strictness can 
effectuate, if the stock-exchange’s trading turnover takes up a decisive segment off 
the economy. Consequentially, the enforcement potential would be necessary to 
establish in Hungary, as the scope of the economy is not the stock-exchange. 
From the aspect of the topic of this study, the question asrises more 
intensely within the field of state-owned enterprises as their property is no private 
but public property.11 
 
2. Corporate governance in the public sector. 
 
In our view, the previously mentioned general assumptions on corporate 
governance are applicable to state-owned enterprises. Special weight is granted to 
this field by that the state as a proprietor raises the duplicity as well as the turning 
into each other of the principal-agent relations. If the state is the proprietor, then 
behind it are the tax-payers. If the company ceases, then it will also result in 
consequences upon the budget, thus behind it are also the tax-payments of the 
citizens. These two areas are interconnected, so it is a theory of a duplex 
commissioner-agent that applies, which results in one triangular process as they 
turn into each other.  
 
 
                                                                 
9  Martin WINNER: „Der UK Corporate Governance Code.” ZGR, (2-3/2012), pp.246-272, 252 and 
Janet DINE: „A new look at corporate governance„(Company Lawyer; 5/2003); pp. 130-131; 130 
10 It is also a legal regulation minimum, that acts must regulate the public disclosure of the affidavit. 
This prescription in Hungary is also included in the Accountancy Act and the Civil Code. 
11  In Hungary, The Fundamental Law of Hungary decrees the principle of responsible and transparent 
management of the public finances. The Fundamental Law of Hungary article N), article 39 (2) 
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2.1.  The definition of state-owned enterprises 
 
Rules over state-owned public companies in Hungary must be divided into 
two. State-owned enterprises are certainly forming a part of the notion.  On the 
other hand, there’s the municipalities that may also hold corporate property.  
  As per The Fundamental Law of Hungary (formerly: The Constitution) the 
economy of Hungary is founded on value-adding work as well as the freedom of 
enterprises.12 Everyone possesses the right to select work and occupation freely, 
and to enterprise, however, everyone is obligated to contribute by his or her 
capabilities and circumstances to the growth of the community.13 Besides the 
freedom of occupation and enterprises everyone possesses the right to own 
property, that is bound by social responsibility.14 Relating especially to this the 
Fundamental Law of Hungary decrees that the proprieties of both the state and the 
municipalities comprise the national property.15 The Fundamental Law of Hungary 
decrees that any legal entity established upon the basis of acts of law is entitled to 
hold such fundamental rights and is subject to such liabilities that are not only 
applicable to humans by their nature.16 In terms of the national fortune, The 
Fundamental Law of Hungary regulates the fortune of the state and the 
municipalities, and also the principles of economy   in a unified manner; 
specifically highlighting that the economic organizations owned by the state and 
the municipalities conduct their economy in a manner determined by acts of law, 
independently and responsibly, in accordance with the demands imposed by 
legality, appropriateness and productivity.17 The National Assets Act as of 2011. 
CXCVI. [hereinafter: Nvtv.] also keeps this duplicity, and alongside the state 
property it marks the property of the local self-government as well. For this reason, 
at the study of the economic organizations operating through state-involvement, we 
must expand the notion to the local self-governments, too.18 
                                                                 
12 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, article M) (1) 
13 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, article XII (1) 
14 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, article XIII (1) The constitutional legal status of the stat e 
property demonstrates a clear system in The Basic Law, yet the earlier Constitution – not only in 
it’s authentic text, but also after the change of regime – decreed upon the status of public property. 
§ 9 (1) of the Constitution decreed, that the economy  of Hungary is such market-economy, in 
which the public property and the private property share the same rank.14 The Constitutional Court 
evaluated this as the expansion of the discrimination interdict to the property right, which in 
essence defines a discrimination interdict to any forms of property. § 70/A. of the Constitution, 
Const. Court Provision 1990. 81. To the dismantling of the privileges of the state property See: 
SÓLYOM László: „Az alkotmánybíráskodás kezdetei Magyarországon”. Osiris, (Budapest, 2001) 
pp. 128-130 
15 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, article 38 
16 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, article I. (4), which decree equals the earlier provisions of the 
Constitutional Court (first 21/1990. (X. 4.) Const.Court Provision, 7/1991. (II. 28.) Const. Court 
Provision, with laid principles. 
17 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, article 38 
18 To the property of the local self-governments see: András Patyi – Ádám Rixer (Eds.): „Hungarian 
Public Administration and Administrativ Law”, (Schenk Verlag, Passau, 2014) pp. 342-345 
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Act CVI of 2007 on the fortune of the state that is the State Property Act 
[hereinafter: Ávtv.] came into force after the termination of the institutional 
privatization, and regulated the property conditions of the state arranged in a new 
frame.19 As per the prescriptions of the Ávtv., the following items are the 
constituents of the property in the proprietorship of the Hungarian state: the things 
in the proprietorship of the state, and also the natural forces that can be utilized like 
things; other than this all of such property, respective of which the act specifies the 
exclusive proprietor’s right of the state, such stock-paper in the proprietorship of 
the state which identifies membership rights, and also any other corporate shares 
that are due to the state,  any such immaterial rights bearing property value that are 
due to the state, which are specified by an act as a right of property value, the 
monetary assets in the proprietorship of the state.20 
The duty of the exercising of proprietorial rights and assets management 
examined from the aspect of our topic is:  to ensure the efficient, cost-saving, 
value-preserving,  value-adding application (direct application) of the state-
property in compliance with it’s function –  necessary for the fulfilment of state 
duties, sufficing of social necessities, and fostering the realization of the economy-
policy of the Government, based on unified principles and appearing as an 
individual branch –, as well as the  indirect utilization (including it’s sale resulting 
in the change of the property index ), and also the  enhancement of state property 
(including the expansion of the property index).21 Rules of law designate the 
Hungarian National Assets Management plc (hereinafter: MNV Zrt.) to exercise 
the proprietorship rights. 
Beside the companies operating through state-involvement in the case of 
the local self-governments, the board of representatives holds the right to found 
various types of organizations, in order to conduct the public services that are 
forming it’s scope of duties.22 Examples to that may be budget organs, economic 
organs, nonprofit organs and other organs.23 
Based on the above, we can declare that „public property” can be 
segmented into two, due to the Hungarian constitutional traditions and also 
according to the effective system of law: first to the property of the state, and then 
to the property of the municipalities. Regarding the property of the state, it can be 
decared, that it can be segmented further: to treasury property and business 
                                                                 
19 Property, obviously covers a broader range as compared to propriety, yet the chapter only analyzes 
the rules included in the portfolio of economic companies. 
20 Ávtv. 1. § (2) 
21 Ávtv. 2. § (1) 
22 Act CLXXXIX of 2011. § 41. (6) 
23 To the topic-area of the corporate governance of the local self-government see: HORVÁTH M. 
Tamás: „Felelős társaságirányítás – közszektorban?” (Gazdaság és Jog, 2013/1.) pp. 12-16., 
and:„Vállalati részesedés igazgatása – köztulajdoni körben” In: Lapsánszky A.- Patyi A.: „Ünnepi 
kötet Verebélyi Imre 70. születésnapjára. Rendszerváltás, demokrácia és államreform az elmúlt 25 
évben”. (Akadémiai, Wolters Kluwer, Budapest 2014.) pp. 221-229.  
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property.24 The function of treasury property is of the exclusively state-owned 
property, the restrictedly negotiable property, the national property of highly 
distinguished concern from a national economy’s perspective, all of which are 
itemized in the Act on National Assets.25 The business property is the property that 
forms no part of the whole of  the treasury property.26 Following this scheme, 
Sárközy Tamás argues the existence of business property, yet acknowledging 
meanwhile that it can still exist, like: the backup companies of the state (for 
instance companies pursuing educational, research activities), companies of 
strategical interest, which are in the permament proprietorship of the state as they 
are facilitating the fulfilment of public duties.27 Nonetheless, this system in this 
composition does not work immaculately, but both the existence and the scope of 
the business property are in perpetual change, aligning with the ever up-to-date 
tendencies of economy-politics.  
From an administrative perspective, based on Act CVI of 2007 in terms of 
the state property, the entirety of all rights and liabilities of proprietorship due to 
the Hungarian state shall be designated to exercise by the Hungarian National 
Assets Management plc. (hereinafter: MNV Zrt.).28 The MNV Zrt. is a one-man 
joint-stock (public) company founded by the state, and the stock of which is non-
negotiable.29 From among the items of state property included in the duties of the 
MNV Zrt., the Ávtv. specifically mentions the stock-paper  in the proprietorship of 
the state, which identifies membership rights, and other company shareholdings, 
that are  due to the state.30 
In Hungary, there are no such special company forms as to conduct 
publicly-owned economic activities, however, the state applies the company forms 
regulated by the Civil Code while conducting these activities. 
It’s not only that the Hungarian legal system is unfamiliar with any 
peculiar company types, but also that it fulfils many public duties in the form a 
public business associations. These companies have peculiar public-law relevance, 
status, such as Hungary’s central bank, The Hungarian National Bank (MNB), as 
an example. The Hungarian National Bank is a legal entity, operating in the form 
of a joint-stock (public) company. In our view, the MNV Zrt.  falls in the same 
category as well, which is a one-man joint-stock (public) company founded by the 
state, and the stock of which is non-negotiable. The Hungarian National Assets 
                                                                 
24  TORMA András: „A nemzetgazdaság igazgatása.” In: Közigazgatási jog II. - Fejezetek 
szakigazgatásaink köréből. Lapsánszky András (Ed.) (Complex, Budapest, 2013) pp.23-59. 43. 
Analyzes the notion of business property: SÁRKÖZY Tamás: „A korai privatizációtól a késői 
vagyontörvényig”. (Hvgorac, Budapest. 2009) pp.192-195. 
25  TORMA A.: op.cit. 43. 
26  Uo. 
27  SÁRKÖZY: op.cit. 193. 
28  Act CVI of 2007 § 1 (6a) 
29  The approval as well as the amendment of the foundation deed of the MNV Zrt. forms the 
competence of the minister. The MNV Zrt. may not tranform, may not disunite, may not unite 
with another company. Upon it’s termination the Parliament may decree in Ávtv. § 18 (1) 
30  Ávtv. § 1 (2) c) 
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Management PLC. pursues state service, among others is executes proprietory 
rights over the state fortune. However, the realization of the general prescriptions 
of civil law varies with respect to each one of the scenarios, and in fact the specific 
prescriptions affect relevant elements of the regulation. 
 
2.2. The corporate governance question 
 
In our perception, regarding the companies owned by the state, the 
realization of corporate governance shall be differentiated depending on the 
economic profile that they bear. 
The first (1) are the activities conducted by the state trough it’s a 
monopolist position, with the formation of the regulation. More precisely it does 
not permit any other market-players to enter, yet the activity itself is profitale. 
Second (2) is the economic situation, when the activity itself is non-profitable, but 
it couldn’t even be, as it identifies the social function of the state. The sector of 
public services is an example to this. The (3) last one is the marketplace situation, 
which means that the state as a player in the economic competition is involved in 
the competition. In this case, only the membership position can be linked with the 
state. Each one of the above economic situaitons connects with a different 
governance problem scenario. In the first case (1), the demands for the 
transparency on the operation of the management can come forth.  The second (2) 
is a special case, as this field of the economy has been blending with the legal 
system of the European Union, at the arrangement of the activity specific 
requirements must be justifed, so the membership position of the state and the 
internal operation of the company may just as well be the subject of corporate 
governance rules. The role of the state can appear the most conspicuously in the 
third (3) case, when the state may not create a more advantegous situation against 
other market-players. 
We assume, that the variant economic grounds impose variant emphases 
upon the fields of corporate governance, yet none of the economic grounds can 
overshadow the relevance of corporate governance. By the question of the  state-
property, we believe, the real corporate governance question is that whether the 
state- as a member, the state- as a member of the company possesses more-, or any 
different rights than a traditional company does? Are these, at all, ensured by 
corporate law even as an option, or not?  
For the sake of entirety, let us note that it qualifies a situation to 
differentiate from the above aspect, when as a special state-intervention, the public 
company becomes designated by the Government as of a strategically outstanding 
concern. This has a relevance when the activity of the company is distinctive (for 
instance it conducts public services, it has a connectivity to national defence). This 
designation only matters when it comes to the condition of insolvency, as those 
procedures prescribe peculiar rules. 
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3. The applicable rules to state (public) companies  
 
Corporate governance can be scrutinized in two angles in the case of 
economic organizations operating through state-, or municipality involvement. One 
of them is the intern relations, namely that how do the principles of corporate 
governance become implemented in economic organizations established by the 
state or the municipality. In answer to this there are the principles developed by the 
OECD. The collection of recommendations was first issued by the OECD in 2005, 
then it was in 2015, when during the general review on corporate governance the 
new code was introduced. The recommendations are applicable to such business 
associations as legal persons, in which the state executes the proprietorship rights – 
and holds an influential-, a sovereign role –, and also to such public-law legal 
subjects, which have an economic role.31 Here, in our view, the emphasis falls on 
that whether the state as a shareholder has got relevant influence on the decision-
making of the company. Certain forms of influencing (golden share, majority 
shareholder etc.) draw different governance-issues, and with this different 
resolutions, too.  According to the recommendation, the performance of this sector 
makes a competitiveness factor.  
The explanation for the creation of the recommendations directive to the 
economic organizations operating through state-, or municipality involvement is 
the aim to professionalize the ownership function of the state, the implementation 
of efficiency, transparency and mandatory reporting to the degree of the private 
economy, and to ensure equital treatment rules in such cases when the state-owned 
company is active on the same markeplace with the competition-field.32 Corporate 
governance plays a vital role in the development of these warranties, furthermore, 
the recommendation highlights that the utilization of corporate governance 
practices is an essential prerequisite to a financially effective privatization as well.  
Special relevance must be attributed to this particular objective in Hungary and in 
Central and Eastern Europe, although after the privatizations accomplished in the 
past, it is now the utilization of recommendations directive to the state as a role-
player of the active economy that can be detected.   
In the recommendations directive to state companies, it is recorded that the 
document includes specific prescriptions, complementary requirements against the 
document on general corporate governance,33 thus the efficient system of corporate 
governance can be composed by the concurrent reading of the two 
recommendations.  
On the basis of the recommendations, troughout the ivolvement of the state a 
distinctive attention must be paid to that the state should provide an efficient legal 
regulation framework to the market-players, without distorting the competition by 
it’s presence. With respect to the regulation, the state must avoid the creation of 
special, merely self-applicable rules, as that would demonstrate a market-distorting 
                                                                 
31 OECD 2015. 15. 
32 OECD 2015. 11. 
33 OECD/G20 Corporate Governance Principles 
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impact, moreover, it must be aiming at the standardization of legal subject 
categories whilst avoiding the establishment of the peculiar type of a state 
company.34 The state as the owner is advised to develop such a procedure, that can 
fulfil the obligation of accounting by means of transparency, without any 
distortion. All through this, the following must be considered with: exercising the 
voting right, transparency of the nomination of the directorship board, ensuring 
independent and impartial decision-making to all participants of the decision-
making. Beyond these, the recommendations also affect the obligations of the 
board, the stakeholders, the requirements of transparency, and the enforcement of 
the demands of equital treatment, yet with respect to these, the prescriptions do not 
include special provisions against general rules, but the collection of 
recommendations itself refers back to general rules.35 
We claim, that there is another possible way and concept to the application 
of corporate governance: this means the extern processes, namely those, in which 
the state participates as a contrating party. One point of connectivity is that the Act 
on National Assets has introduced the notion of transparency, meaning 
fundamentally the analysis via tax-lability criteria and the revelation of 
memberhip.36 The core principle of the management of the national property is that 
an agreement can only be concluded by an organization, if it is transparent.37 In our 
view, the state may just as well apply such principes in it’s procurements, in the 
course of public procurement. Investments and procurements accomplished under 
the course of public procurement can be compatible to take into account further 
aspects besides profit, thus the utilization and enforcement of corporate governance 
principles can appear as a requirement equivalent to this.38 
 
3.1.  The corporate governance recommendations by the MNV Zrt 
 
The MNV Zrt. has issued a document alongside the international standards 
of the corporate governance, to reinforce the Hungarian corporate governance 
practice. By this, we believe, that it has taken a regionally prominent place in terms 
of corporate governance thinking. 
The Hungarian National Assets Management plc (MNV Zrt.) has issued a 
recommendation to the companies in the ownership of the state, inclusive of 
recommendations and guidelines in a complex system, addressing the society of 
economic organizations operating through state-involvement.  
The code was proclaimed in the spring of 2013 by the MNV Zrt. The 
corporate governance ground directive to the companies constituted of several 
parts:39 
                                                                 
34 OECD 2015. 38. 
35 To these see: PAPP  Tekla (Ed.): „Társasági jog”, (Lectum, Szeged, 2011) pp. 532-533. 
36 Nvtv. § 3 (1) 
37 This aspect appears in the Nemzetivtv. among others in: 8. § (1), 12. § (13) 
38 See European Court of Justice C-368/10 European Commission – Dutch Kingdom case 
39 Available at: http://www.mnvzrt.hu/vallalatiranyitasi_ajanlasok/vallalatiranyitasi_ajanlasok.html 
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- Corporate Governance Recommendations 
- Code of Ethics, according to the initial idea of which to the emloyees of the 
public service, it is ethical norms of higher level than the average that are 
setting the directives, and they are also required to comply with such 
professional ethic principles that apply exclusively to those in the public 
service.  
- Risk-management Manual, the target of which is to promote the 
recognition of direction problems, the shaping of the propositions for a 
sound resolution beyond  a risk-management methodology,  grounded on 
an analysis of abilities to direct, and the familiarization with the applicable 
control-models.  
- Investment policy -related recommendation. The target of the 
recommendation is to provide support in terms of the utilization of free 
monetary assets and currency rate risk-management, by the application of 
which the regulations of the companies can be compiled.    
- Liquiditiy planning recommendation. In the case of the companies owned 
by the state it projects the operation of a so-called four-week rolling 
liquidity planning system. Primarily, the collection of recommendations 
reinforces the stream of information towards the leadership of the 
company, it provides alternatives for the management on liquidity-
problems, and cornerstones to elicit the selection of proper invesment 
options, given a liquidity surplus. 
 
3.2.  The place of the recommendations among the Hungarian corporate 
government requirements  
 
The Hungarian rules of law prescribe it to the business associations 
registered on the regulated market to publicly disclose their corporate governance 
affidavit. Act LII of 2007 incorporated the mandatory preparation of a corporate 
governance report into the corporte law, that has been upheld by the Civil Code as 
well. The board of directors of the publicly-traded joint stock company is mandated 
to present the report, exposing the corporate governance practice followed by the 
joint-stock company, which is compiled in the format prescribed for the 
pariticpants of the given stoc-exchange, to the annual ordinary general assembly, 
the approval of which shall be decided by the general assembly. The provision of 
the general assembly along with the approved report are mandated to publicly 
disclose on the website of the joint-stock company.40 
Then the public disclosure of the corporate governance affidavit was also 
incorporated into the Accountancy Act – in line with the obligation on the 
harmonisation of law in the European Union 41 – as regards of such enterpreneurs, 
                                                                 
40 Act IV of 2006 on business associations (hereinafter: Gt.) § 312 (1)-(2), Civil Code. § 3:289, which 
is a cogent rule    
41 Act CXXVI of 2007, having served the compliance with the directive 2006/46/EK. 
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whose tradeable stock-papers have been entered in the regulated market of a state 
within the European Economic Area.42 
Besides the corporate governance affidavit,  the decrees of the corporate 
law on the rules of public disclosure were complemented in a special field in 2009 
that was: the remuneration,  as the publicly-traded joint stock companies entered 
into the regulated market, were obligated to publicly disclose on an annual basis on 
their website, at the time of summoning the annual ordinary general assembly, the 
names of the directorhip or the board of directors and, where applicable, also the 
names of the members of the supervisory-board, along with all monetary and non-
monetary remuneration allocated to the members by their membership quality, in a 
way itemized by member and legal title of the remuneration, in a detailed format. 
In addition, the joint stock companies had to ensure continuous access to all such 
data on their websites as well.43 The rule has been amended by the Civil Code, and 
the new norm delegates the due definition of the principles upon the longterm 
remuneration and incentives’ system  to leading officers, members of the 
supervisory-board and management employees, into the exclusive competence of 
the general assembly.44 
The corporate governance affidavit is to be prepared on the basis of the 
hungarian Corporate Governance Recommendations (FTA) issued by the  
Budapest Stock Exchange in 2004 for the first time. The FTA touches upon four 
topic-areas: (1) the rights of the shareholders and the respective procedures, (2) the 
competence of the directorship/ board of directors, and the members of the 
supervisory-board, (3) the committees, (4) transparency and public disclosure, and 
the respective recommendations and guidelines. The introduction of the 
recommendation declares that the alignment with the prescriptions of the document 
is advised, yet non-mandatory. 
According to the FTA, the companies are ordered to testify their 
governance practice in two ways. The first part of the report must supply a 
comprehensive elaboration on the corporate governance applied in the targeted 
business year, also marking the instances of any incidental peculiar circumstances 
with that. Thereafter, an announcement must be made upon the compliance with 
the points of the  FTA, in a manner identical with the international practice:  a 
public statement is to be given on the basis of the comply or explain principle. This 
means that whereas the compliance with the  recommendation of the FTA must 
not-, yet the incompliance must well be explained, however, there is no obligation 
for any explanation regarding the guidelines. The code was significantly revised in 
2008, the amendments of which gained force on the 16th of May, 2008. The code 
was then revised in November, 2012 again, but this time not any relevant, 
comprehensive changes were drawn. 
In the case of the FVA, the recommendation stays unresponsive in this 
matter. However, we have not traced any references as to whether the companies 
                                                                 
42 Act C of 2000, § 95/B (1)-(3) 
43 Gt. § 312/A 
44 Civil Code § 3:268 (2)  
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should issue any form of a statement regarding what is covered by the collection of 
recommendations. Thus, the question remains open as to what is the form, in which 
the company may be expected to give an account, and can issue a public statement.  
 
3.3.  Specific prescriptions 
 
Regarding to the regulation of state-owned companies, it can be established 
that to these companies also, it is the Civil Code, and not special norms that are to 
be applied in general.45 We can also assert that to complete any public assignment, 
to provide any public services may be demonstrated in accordance with the general 
(Civil Code) regulations and the specific prescriptions are to be applied as a 
directive only to the organization of state-owned companies.46 
The corporate governance has relevance at state-owned companies in both 
intern (a) and extern (b) relations: 
a) how the principles of corporate governance can be effective at the 
economic organizations founded by state or by local government (see 
OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-owned 
Enterprises 2005, focused examination by Worldbank Group and Act 
CVI of 2007 on state property in Hungary); 
b) how the state or the self-government contracting party can be (see the 
aspects in tax law and public procurement in Hungary).47 
Neither the Hungarian Civil Code,48 nor the Recommendations of Budapest 
Stock Exchange for Corporate Governance of Public Company Limited by Shares 
2012 contain special provisions for economic enterprises owned by state or by 
local government. However, the MNV Zrt. has Recommendations for Corporate 
Governance of Enterprises Owned by State or Self-government, with principles for 
lawful operation of these companies.49 The special regulation for state-(or self-
government)-owned companies can be basically found in two acts: Act CXXII of 
2009 on more economical operation of state-owned companies and Act CXCVI of 
2011 on national assets. 
                                                                 
45 ZOVÁNYI Nikolett „Kié a felelősség? A társasági jog útvesztőiben” (Who is responsible? Public 
enterprises in the labyrinth of company law) (http://www.kozjavak.hu/hu/kie-felelosseg-
kozvallalatok-tarsasagi-jog-utvesztoiben; 2015. 12.18.9; FÉZER Tamás „Két úr szolgái – a 
közvállalatok vezető tisztségviselőinek felelőssége” (Servants of two gentlemen – the liability of 
executive officers of public enterprises) (http://www.kozjavak.hu/hu/ket-ur-szolgai-kozvallalatok-
vezeto-tisztségviseloinek-felelossege; 2016. 02. 19.) 
46 PAPP  Tekla – AUER Ádám „Group Interest in Hungary” (Acta Universitatis Sapientiae; p. 17.; 
forthcoming) 
47 AUER Ádám „Corporate Govermance, Állami részvétellel működő gazdálkodó szervezetek” 
(Corporate Governance, Economic Organizations Participated by State) (NKE; Budapest; 2015.; 
p. 13.,41.); AUER Ádám „Corporate Governance az állami vagy önkormányzati részvétellel 
működő gazdálkodó szervezetek esetében” (Corporate Governance at the Economic Organizations 
Participated by State and Self-government) (In: Adózási pénzügytan és államháztartási 
gazdálkodás; ed.: Lentner Csaba; NKE; Budapest¿ 2015.; pp. 811-812.) 
48 Act V of 2013 
49 AUER I. op.cit. pp. 58-68.; AUER II. op.cit. pp. 816-824. 
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In the following, we describe the special rules of these two acts for the 
enterprises of state and local governments on the base of seven aspects. 
1) Special prohibitions of further association 
Such companies owned in 100% by state or local government, which was 
founded for performing public duties, mustn’t establish another company for these 
public duties.50 The state and the self-government mustn’t found such company and 
mustn’t get share in such company which is not transparent.51 Non-profit company 
with majority control of state/self-government is permitted to create an other non-
profit company with majority control of state/self-government – apart from 
recycling activity -, but this new non-profit company mustn’t establish further 
companies.52 These provisions also have to apply to the acquisition of share in 
other business associations by enterprises owned by state or local government.53 
2) Special issues relating to assets 
The share of company providing public service and with majority control of 
state may be available as contribution in kind or on the ground of other transferring 
legal title only for companies owned in 100% by state/self-government.54 The share 
of company providing public and parking service, with majority control of local 
government and of Balaton Shipping Private Company Limited by Shares may be 
available as contribution in kind or on the ground of other transferring legal title 
only for companies owned in 100% by state/self-government.55 These mean limited 
transferability of shares of state/self-government in companies. The share in 
companies owned by state/self-government mustn’t be an object of assets 
management;56 it means limited legal title and legal base of privity. In connection 
with the share in companies owned by state, which is a part of national assets and 
important from the national economy, only the minister pointed out by act, or a 
central budgetary agency or an economic enterprises owned in 100% by state may 
exercise the owner’s rights;57 it means limited circle of exercisors of proprietor’s 
rights. To the increase of capital at company owned in more than 50% by state/self-
government which reduces the proportion of state/self-government 
 the consent of the exerciser of owner’s rights is necessary, 
 over 2.000.000 HUF the resolution of government of Hungary or 
municipal council is required, 
 between 5.000.000 HUF and 2.000.000.000 HUF the resolution of the 
minister, who is responsible for supervision of state assets or municipal 
council, is needed;58 it means limited and controlled capital movements. 
                                                                 
50 Act CXCVI of 2011 §8 (6) 
51 Act CXCVI of 2011 §8 (1) 
52 Act CXCVI of 2011 §8 (8), (9) 
53 Act CXCVI of 2011 §8 (1), (8), (9) 
54 Act CXCVI of 2011 §4 (6) 
55 Act CXCVI of 2011 §5 (8) 
56 Act CXCVI of 2011 §8 (7) 
57 Act CXCVI of 2011 §7/A (3) 
58 Act CXCVI of 2011 §8 (10) 
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In the name of the state MNV Zrt. and the Hungarian Development Bank 
Private Company Limited by Shares may give credits and loans to the companies 
with majority control of state.59 
The reasonable undertaken business risks are determined by company 
activity and its background, the market surroundings.60 
In Poland the ownership rights in state-owned companies were centralized 
in one organization: Ministry of Treasury, which was dismissed by the prime 
minister in September 2016.61 Lithuania has a decentralised SOE ownership 
structure, with twelve ministries.62 In Romania there is neither single ownership 
entity: beside the Authority for Administration of State Assets several authorities, 
ministries have ownership function.63 
3) Special rules of organization 
Among the state-owned companies, at the private limited companies the 
operative organ usually is the general manager and if the importance, size, type of 
operation of the company is explained itself, then the operative organ is the board 
of directors (with 3-5 members).64 The legislator allows only the two-tier/dualistic 
system, but not the one-tier/monistic system for organization of state-owned 
companies;65 the same refers to in Poland, Czech Republic,66 Serbia67 and 
Lithuania, but the one-tier organizational system is allowed in Romania.68 
                                                                 
59  Act CXCV of 2011 § 45 (1) 
60  FÉZER op.cit.; BH 2004. 372. 
61  Kaja Zaleska-Korziuk „Report on corporate governance in state-owned enterprises – the Polish 
perspective” (presentation „Corporate governance of state-owned enterprises in Central and 
Eastern Europe”; 14. 10. 2016.; Budapest; National University of Public Service and Societas 
CEE Company Law Research Network) 
62 Edvardas Juchnevicius „The corporate governance of state-owned enterprises in Lithuania” 
(presentation „Corporate governance of state-owned enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe”; 
14. 10. 2016.; Budapest; National University of Public Service and Societas CEE Company Law 
Research Network) 
63  Veress Emőd „The state’s role as owner of enterprises: mandatory rules of corporate governance 
in Romania” (presentation „Corporate governance of state-owned enterprises in Central and 
Eastern Europe”; 14. 10. 2016.; Budapest; National University of Public Service and Societas 
CEE Company Law Research Network) 
64  Act CXXII of 2009 §3 (1) 
65  About this see more details in: Papp Tekla „Corporate governance – felelős társaságirányítás” 
(Corporate Governance – Responsible Guidance of Companies) (Acta Juridica et Politica; Tomus 
LXXIII; Fasciculus 1-64.; Szeged; 2008.; pp. 639-653.) 
66  Katerina Eichlerova „Corporate governance of state-owned enterprises in the Czech Republic” 
(presentation „Corporate governance of state-owned enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe”; 
14. 10. 2016.; Budapest; National University of Public Service and Societas CEE Company Law 
Research Network) 
67  Branislav Malagurski „Challenges of Serbian public enterprises in the light of points II C and F 
of OECD Guidelines on corporate governance of state-owned enterprises” (presentation 
„Corporate governance of state-owned enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe”; 14. 10. 2016.; 
Budapest; National University of Public Service and Societas CEE Company Law Research 
Network) 
68  International workshop: „Corporate governance in state-owned companies”, 11. 04. 2016., 
Gdansk, University Gdansk Faculty of Law and Administration, Societas CEE Company Law 
Research  Network 
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According to the Austrian Public Corporate Governance Code, the state-owned 
companies with more than 30 employees or with more than 1 million euro turnover 
shall have a supervisory board consisting of state elected members.69 At the state-
owned companies in Hungary is obligatory to form supervisory board with 3 
members (over 200.000.000 HUF between 3 and 6 members).70 
4) Special provision for decision 
At the companies with majority control of state/self-government, the 
competence of supreme body includes the foundation, the termination of economic 
association, the acquisition and the transfer of shares in economic association.71 
5) Special prescriptions for remuneration 
The state-owned companies have to create a regulation about the mode, 
measure, principles and system of allowance of executive officers and of the 
members of the supervisory board;72 non-compliance with this regulation is 
prohibited and unlawful.73 The executive officer and the member of supervisory 
board may receive remuneration only in one state-owned company, comparing to 
the current least wage (sevenfold of current least wage at the president of executive 
board, fivefold of current least wage at members of board of directors, fivefold at 
the president of supervisory board and threefold of current least wage at members 
of supervisory board). 74 In Poland there is a similar situation: the remuneration of 
executives equals to the index of an average monthly wage in state-owned 
enterprises as of the last quarter of the previous year announced by the Central 
Statistical Office, at small state-owned enterprises multiplied by one to three, at the 
largest state-owned companies multiplied by seven to fifteen.75 
6) Special regulation of transparency 
The state-owned company shall publish the name, the function and the 
allowances of its executive officers and of its supervisory board members.76 The 
head of the state-owned company shall be liable for the publication of these data, 
for its continuous availability and for the authenticity of publication.77 
7) Special shareholder’s rights 
At the state-owned company providing fundamental services, the state may 
exercise the right of option to purchase shares which are not its property in the 
interest of safety of supply, of supplying duties, of increasing efficiency, of 
                                                                 
69  Martin Winner „Autonomy and Independence in SOEs” (presentation „Corporate governance of 
state-owned enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe”; 14. 10. 2016.; Budapest; National 
University of Public Service and Societas CEE Company Law Research Network) 
70  Act CXXII of 2009 §4 (1) 
71  Act CXCVI of 2011 §8 (14) 
72  Act CXXII of 2009 §5 (3) 
73  Act CXXII of 2009 §5 (4) 
74  Act CXXII of 2009 §6 
75  Bartlomiej Gliniecki „Current fundamental changes of the boards members’ remuneration in 
Poland” (presentation „Corporate governance of state-owned enterprises in Central and Eastern 
Europe”; 14. 10. 2016.; Budapest; National University of Public Service and Societas CEE 
Company Law Research Network) 
76  Act CXXII of 2009 §2 (1) 
77  Act CXXII of 2009 §2 (1) 
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national economic strategy.78 Any shareholders at the state-owned company may 
request that the shareholder exercised the right of option to purchase shall buy his 
shares (the selling right).79 These rights are obligatory and pecuniary rights, not 
rights in accordance with exercise of classical member’s right. 
8) Special accounts requirements80 
The public enterprises have to separate the state subventions in their 
internal accounting. The public enterprises must keep a record of the dividend, the 
financial benefits and the waiver of recovery of used state monetary assets. The 
public enterprises, those net revenue exceeded 250 million euro in the previous 
business year, shall send to the competent revenue office within six months from 
the closing of business year 
 their account (with the balance sheet report), 
 business report, 
 statement about accounting policy, 
 reports of executive officers, 
 data about own shares, own business shares, preference shares, 
priority bonds, 
 data about not-repayable supports, loans, guarantees, 
 data about the payed-out dividends and the held-back profit, 
 data about any kind of state intervention. 
In Serbia the State Aid Institution is legally obliged to conduct annual 
audits of state-owned companies.81 
9) Acceptance of discharge state duties of state-owned companies by 
central budgetary agency 
The central budgetary agency may take over the discharge state duties from 
the companies owned in 100 % by state, then the concerned company must be 
terminated and for the debts of terminating company there is no liability of 
company’s member (according to the Civil Code).82 At the time point of 
acceptance of discharge state duties the assets in the property of company owned in 
100 % by state devolve to the state and the trusteeship is due to the central 
budgetary agency.83 At the time point of acceptance of discharge state duties the 
central budgetary agency is the successor of all rights and commitments of the 
company owned in 100 % by state.84 
 
*** 
                                                                 
78 Act CXXII of 2009 §7/A (1) 
79 Act CXXII of 2009 §7/F (1) 
80 On the ground of 3009/2012. NAV útmutató (Guide of the National Revenue and Customs Office) 
81 Branislav Malagurski „Challenges of Serbian public enterprises in the light of points II C and F of 
OECD Guidelines on corporate governance of state-owned enterprises” (presentation „Corporate 
governance of state-owned enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe”; 14. 10. 2016.; Budapest; 
National University of Public Service and Societas CEE Company Law Research Network) 
82 Act CXCV of 2011 § 11/A (1), (1a) 
83 Act CXCV of 2011 § 11/B (2) 
84 Act CXCV of 2011 § 11/C (1) 
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The Hungarian regulation on state- and self government-owned companies 
are theoretically keeping with OECD Guidelines, but not so detailed and 
comprehensive. The above discussed provisions are not so transparent and too 
general, we – the outsiders – do not have enough information how these rules 
operate in the practice in Hungary… 
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